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Helicopter Observations: When do They Constitute
a Search?
INTRODUCTION
The modern potential for aerial surveillance by police helicop-
ters, in effect, decreases the zone of privacy around the home. The
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution has been
interpreted to protect citizens against unreasonable searches and
seizures within this zone of privacy, whether the searches are
made at ground level or from the air.'
Suppose that during a routine patrol, a police helicopter investi-
gates an informant's tip that marijuana is being grown in the
backyard of a house in a residential area. The officers operating
the helicopter, who have been trained to recognize marijuana, pro-
ceed to the location and fly over the backyard of the residence at
an altitude ranging between 300 and 500 feet. The officers observe
marijuana growing in a yard which is immediately adjacent to a
house and completely enclosed by a wood fence approximately ten
feet in height. Based upon these unenhanced, naked eye observa-
tions, police obtain a search warrant for the residence and yard.
The search yields a substantial quantity of marijuana plants, and
the resident of the house is arrested.
Further suppose that the defendant files a pre-trial motion to
suppress the evidence gained in this search on the grounds that
the observations made by the officers in the helicopter violated the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.2 The mo-
tion is granted and the United States Supreme Court grants cer-
tiorari on the issue. What is the likely result?
The United States Supreme Court recently concluded that
backyard surveillance from a lawfully operated fixed-wing aircraft
does not violate the fourth amendment.' Is there any reason to
suppose that a different outcome should result merely because the
surveillance aircraft is a helicopter rather than a fixed-wing air-
craft? The Court has, in fact, granted certiorari to answer this
very question.4
1. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See also, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In California, this challenge would be made
pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5.
3. 476 U.S. at 215. See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
4. Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (1987), cert. granted, Florida v. Riley (Feb. 22,
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In Riley v. State,5 the defendant rented a five acre parcel of
rural property. He lived in a mobile home and had a greenhouse
located approximately ten to twenty feet from the mobile home.
Both buildings were enclosed by a net wire fence, and a "Do Not
Enter" sign was posted in front of the mobile home.' The green-
house was enclosed on two sides, and the other two sides were
partially obscured by trees and shrubbery within the fenced area.
Two panels were missing from the roof of the greenhouse, expos-
ing approximately one-tenth of the roof area.7
An anonymous informant told the Pasco County Sheriff's Office
that the defendant was growing marijuana. A deputy investigated
but was unable to see the contents of the greenhouse from the
road. The deputy left and obtained a helicopter.8 Flying at an alti-
tude of approximately 400 feet the helicopter circled over the
green house twice. Through openings in the roof, the deputy saw
what appeared to be marijuana and obtained a search warrant to
search the greenhouse.9 The Florida Supreme Court held that this
aerial observation from a helicopter violated the defendant's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and thus constituted an illegal
search10 the United States Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari.
This Comment argues that aerial surveillance by a helicopter at
an altitude of 300 to 500 feet does not offend the fourth amend-
ment and is not unreasonable if the aircraft is: (1) being lawfully
operated, and (2) not unreasonably intrusive. Further, it is argued
that the only difference between surveillance by a fixed-wing air-
craft at an altitude of 1,000 feet and surveillance by a helicopter
at an altitude of 300 to 500 feet is the degree of physical
intrusion.
In order to reach this conclusion, this Comment first discusses
the current fourth amendment analyses determinative of whether
an aerial observation constitutes a search. Second, it analyzes the
relevant Supreme Court and lower court cases and applies them to
the concepts of navigable airspace and intrusiveness. Finally, this
Comment suggests that the Court adopt a test suggested by com-
ments made by Justice White in California v. Sabo," and applied
1988) (No. 87-764).
5. Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282, 283 (1987).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Although photographs were taken from the helicopter during the surveillance,
the photographs were not relied upon for issuance of the search warrant, and thus not at
issue in the case. Id. at 283-84.
10. Id. at 289.
11. cert. denied 107 S. Ct. 2200 (May 18, 1987) (No. 86-1289) (White, J., dissent-
[Vol. 24
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in Giancola v. State of West Virginia Department of Public
Safety.1 2
I. AN AERIAL OBSERVATION IS NOT NECESSARILY A SEARCH
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."13 It provides protection to people, not places.1 4 This
standard of modern fourth amendment analysis derives from Jus-
tice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,"' in
which a person is found to have a constitutionally protected, rea-
sonable expectation of privacy when: (1) the individual exhibits a
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search, and (2) society is willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable.1 6
"A man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy; but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to
the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no inten-
tion to keep them to himself has been exhibited."1 7 However, a
privacy invasion inquiry does not turn upon whether the individual
attempts to conceal purportedly private activity, but rather,
"whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the personal
and societal values protected by the fourth amendment." 8
In addition to the home, the "curtilage" 19 is an area of an indi-
vidual's property where privacy expectations are also significantly
heightened. Therefore, protection is given to the curtilage because
it "is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in
ing). Justice White, in a dissent joined by the Chief Justice, noted that it was possible that
helicopter surveillance could be unreasonably intrusive due to interminable hovering, the
raising of clouds of dust, and unreasonably high noise levels.
12. 830 F.2d 547, 550-51 (4th Cir. 1987). This case was decided on December 10,
1987. The United States Court of Appeals noted that when determining whether aerial
surveillance is unreasonably intrusive, certain factors are relevant. Those factors are: (a)
the total number of instances of surveillance, (b) the frequency of surveillance, (c) the
length of each surveillance, (d) the altitude of the aircraft, (e) the number of aircraft, (f)
the degree of disruption of legitimate activities on the ground, (g) and whether any flight
regulations were violated by the surveillance. Id.
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 360.
16. Id. Unless the government invades a reasonable expectation of privacy, there is
no search for fourth amendment purposes.
17. Id.
18. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 181-83 (1984)).
19. At common law the curtilage is that area "to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." See Oliver, 466
U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
19881
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an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and
psychologically. 20
Although the backyard area immediately adjacent to a home
and surrounded by fences has been deemed to fall within the area
of heightened expectations of privacy,2' police are not barred from
viewing activities within the area of the curtilage. "Nor does the
mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some
views of his activities preclude an officer's observations from a
public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders
the activities clearly visible."' 22 There is no search, for fourth
amendment purposes, unless the government observations violate a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. This
requires "assessing the nature of a particular practice and the
likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security bal-
anced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law
enforcement. 23
In California v. Ciraolo,24 the Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue of aerial observation by police, of a fenced-in residential back-
yard without a search warrant, from a fixed-wing aircraft at an
altitude of 1,000 feet and found that it did not violate the fourth
amendment, even though this area was within the curtilage of the
home.26
In Ciraolo, police had received an anonymous telephone tip that
marijuana was being grown in the subject's backyard. Police were
unable to observe the contents of the yard from the ground level
because a six-foot outer fence and a ten-foot inner fence com-
pletely enclosed the yard.2' Later that day, police officers who
were experts in recognizing marijuana flew over the house and
yard in a plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet.27 Police obtained a
search warrant based upon the aerial observations, confiscated the
marijuana and arrested the defendant.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence obtained as a result of the aerial observations. A Califor-
20. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
21. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
22. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282
(1983)).
23. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. 476 U.S. 207 (1986). This was a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Burger delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor joined.
Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun joined.
25. Id. at 215.
26. Id. at 209.
27. Id.
[Vol. 24
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nia court of appeal reversed, reasoning that the existence of fences
around the yard constituted "objective criteria from which we
may conclude he manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy
by any standard."2 The court found it significant that the flight
was not a routine patrol, but conducted specifically for the pur-
pose of observing the particular yard, and held that the focused
observation was "a direct and unauthorized intrusion into the
sanctity of the home." 29
The United States Supreme Court analyzed the issue by apply-
ing the two-part Katz inquiry.3° First, the Court agreed that the
individual had manifested his own subjective expectation of pri-
vacy by erecting the fences,"' and that the yard was part of the
curtilage of the home. 2 The Court noted that the curtilage is that
area to which extends the "intimate activity associated with the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."33 Thus, the
only remaining issue was whether "naked-eye observation of the
curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully operating at an alti-
tude of 1,000 feet violated an expectation of privacy that is
reasonable.34
The Court stated that although an individual has taken mea-
sures to conceal some views of his activities, this does not preclude
observations by an officer from a public vantage point at which he
has a right to be.35 The Court found that the observations were
made from within public navigable airspace,36 in a physically
nonintrusive manner.3a In doing so, the Court noted that "[w]hat
28. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (1984).
29. Id. at 1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98.
30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
31. Ciralo, 476 U.S. 207, 211. The Court noted that as to normal sidewalk traffic,
the individual had taken normal precautions to maintain his privacy, but the fence would
not prevent observations by a private citizen, "or a policeman perched in the top of a truck
or a two-level bus." Id. The Court expressed reservations as to "whether he had a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy from all observation of his backyard, or whether instead he
manifested i...ely a hope that no one would observe his unlawful gardening pursuits." Id.
at 211-12.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180). In Oliver, the Court noted that the curti-
lage was considered part of the house itself for purposes of the fourth amendment. Id. The
curtilage, like the home, is an area where privacy expectations are significantly heightened.
34. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added). Although photographs were taken,
they were not at issue here as it was the officers' observations that supported the warrant,
not the photographs. Id.
35. Id. at 213.
36. Id. Navigable airspace is defined as that airspace above the minimum altitudes
of flight which are promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board. See 49 U.S.C. § 1301
(29), and 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(b) and (c) (1986). See infra note 43.
Helicopters may be lawfully operated at less than 500 feet if the operation does not
present a hazard to persons or property on the surface. (C.F.R. § 91.79(d) (1986)).
37. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
1988]
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a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,""a and
rejected the California Court of Appeal's analysis. The Supreme
Court said that it was irrelevant that the observations from the
aircraft were directed at identifying marijuana plants in the back-
yard, and held that the expectation that the yard was protected
from such observation was unreasonable and not one that society
was prepared to honor."9 For purposes of the fourth amendment,
the Court held that these observations did not constitute a search
even though the area observed was within the curtilage of the
home.
The Court reasoned that any person flying in that airspace
could have looked down and observed the same things the officers
did and that "in an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to ex-
pect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected
from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000
feet." 40 Fundamental to this decision was the belief that a police
officer has as much of a right to lawfully traverse the airways as
he does to lawfully drive on a public street.
II. LAWFUL FLIGHT AND NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE AS APPLIED TO
HELICOPTERS
It has been argued that the definitions of "lawful flight" and
"navigable airspace" are synonymous. 41 The Supreme Court has
referred to navigable airspace as that airspace that is "above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronau-
tics Authority." 42 The minimum safe altitudes for flight are de-
fined in the Code of Federal Regulations,43 in which section 91.79
38. Id. (quoting Katz v. United 389 U.S. 347 at 351 (1986)).
39. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-214.
40. Id. In a companion case argued on the same day as Ciraolo (Dec. 10, 1985) and
decided on the same day (May 19, 1986) the Court held that the use of an aerial mapping
camera to photograph an industrial manufacturing complex from navigable airspace also
requires no search warrant under the fourth amendment. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227 (1986).
41. Petitioner's Brief at 11, People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845 (1986), cert. de-
nied, S. Ct. 2200 (1987) (No. 86-1289).
42. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 263 (1946).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (29) (1982) provides that: Navigable airspace means airspace
above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter,
and shall include airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft."
14 C.F.R. § 91.79 provides that:
Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft
below the following altitudes:
(a) Anywhere. An altitude allowing if a power unit fails, an emergency landing
without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface.
[Vol. 24
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provides that the minimum altitude for a fixed-wing aircraft over
a congested area of a city, town or settlement, or over any open
air assembly of persons, is 1,000 feet. The regulations also govern
the operation of helicopters, and ultra-light aircraft." Paragraph
(d) of section 91.79 provides that: "[H]elicopters may be operated
at less than the minimums prescribed in paragraph (b) or (c) of
this section if the operation is conducted without hazard to per-
sons or property on the surface. 45 Recently, two California courts
of appeal have, with contrary results, addressed the issue of
whether a helicopter is within navigable airspace.
In People v. Sabo,4" law enforcement officers made observations
from a helicopter at an altitude of approximately 400 feet.47 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that as to helicopters, the
definition of public navigable airspace is not a function of altitude,
and that while helicopters may be operated below the minimum
altitudes applicable to fixed-wing aircraft, "it does not follow that
such operation is conducted within navigable airspace." The court
further stated that "the plain meaning of the statutes defining
navigable airspace as that airspace above specified altitudes com-
pels the conclusion helicopters operated below the minimum are
not in navigable airspace."
48
(b) Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settle-
ment, or over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the
highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft.
(c) Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface
except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In that case, the aircraft may
not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.
(d) Helicopters. Helicopters may be operated at less than the minimums pre-
scribed in paragraph (b) or (c) of this section if the operation is conducted without
hazard to persons or property on the surface. In addition, each person operating a
helicopter shall comply with routes or altitudes specifically for helicopters by the
administrator.
44. Ultra light vehicles are very small, extremely light fixed-wing aircraft. Ultra
lights may carry as many as two persons, but normally are large enough for only one.
These vehicles have a normal operating range of sixty to seventy miles with top speed
capabilities ranging from twenty-four knots to fifty-five knots (26 m.p.h. - 63 m.p.h.). The
standard 2-cycle engine is very quiet, producing a noise similar to a whine, and the propel-
ler is virtually silent, producing almost no wind turbulence. At an altitude of 300 to 500
feet, the noise produced by an ultra light would sound like an off-road motorcycle to people
on the ground. The noise increases with lower altitude and decreased speed. Ultra lights
are extremely maneuverable, although they do not possess the hovering ability of helicop-
ters. Telephone interview with John Balintine, President of the United States Ultra Light
Foundation, Mt. Airy, Maryland (March 11, 1988).
14 C.F.R. § 103.15 provides that "no persons may operate an ultra light vehicle over any
congested area of a city, town or settlement, or over any open air assemble of persons."
45. See supra note 43.
46. 185 Cal. App. 3d 845 (1986).
47. Id. at 847.
48. Id. at 852-53.
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However, in People v. Romo,49 the First District Court of Ap-
peal took a contrary view. In Romo, a police officer flew over a
house in a helicopter. He conducted this overflight at an altitude
of no less than 500 feet. In determining whether the observation
constituted a search, the court stated that it found the reasoning
in Sabo questionable, and the Fourth District's reading of Ciraolo
unduly limiting.50 "Although the Ciraolo court did state that the
plane was in navigable airspace, we do not read the opinion to
mean that the case only applies to helicopters if they are flying at
an altitude of 1,000 feet. Rather the court appeared to emphasize
this fact to make the point that the plane had a right to be where
it was in observing the plants."51 The court noted that the Sabo
court's "conclu3ion that because helicopters do not have minimum
altitude limitations, they are not flying in navigable space when
operating lawfully, is puzzling." The court argued that "[iln fact
certain minimum altitudes do exist for helicopters."52
It is also noteworthy that although helicopters and ultra light
aircraft operations are governed by federal regulations, 53 the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration grants exemptions for aircraft used
in public service, such as police vehicles."
49. No. A037010 (Feb. 11, 1988) (available on Westlaw, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court was referring to 14 C.F.R. § 135.203, which provides that
"[e]xcept when necessary for takeoff and landing, no person may operate under VFR (vis-
ual flight regulations) . . . (b) a helicopter over a congested area at an altitude less than
300 feet above the surface. See also the dissenting opinion of Elkington, J., in People v.
Roberts, 195 Cal. App. 3d 479, 483-86 (1987). In Roberts, police circled over a house
trailer and the greenhouse at an altitude of approximately 300 feet. The officers circled the
property for three or four minutes. The greenhouse was covered with an opaque plastic
material and was connected to the house trailer by a fiberglass-covered breezeway. The
officers observed marijuana in the greenhouse by hovering so that they could see through
an opening at one end of the greenhouse which was covered by a four foot sheet of ply-
wood. The court found that the greenhouse was within the curtilage, and thus the observa-
tion violated article 1, section 13 of the California Constitution. Id. at 482.
It is important to note that this decision was based upon pre Proposition 8 law. Proposi-
tion 8 became effective June 8, 1982 and provides that relevant evidence though unlawfully
obtained under the California Constitution may be excluded only if exclusion is required by
the United States Constitution. See in re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 890, 896, 694 P.2d
744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985). Thus Roberts, was not governed by Ciraolo. The court in
Roberts, did however, note in dicta that the decision in Sabo, provided alternative grounds
for finding the helicopter observation unreasonable. Roberts, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 845-46.
53. See supra notes 43 and 44.
54. The Federal Aviation Administration may grant an exemption from federal avia-
tion regulations for aircraft, including ultra light vehicles, which are used in public service.
These exemptions are frequently granted to law enforcement agencies. Telephone interview
with Vincent Brophy, Investigator with the Federal Aviation Administration, Van Nuys,
California office (March 11, 1988).
Ultra lights, although having similar maneuverability capabilities, are presently not as
practical for use as police aerial surveillance craft. This is because in addition to not being
able to hover, the ultra lights are more susceptible to wind turbulence during low altitude
8
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The reasoning in Romo is the better view because the language
used by the Supreme Court in Ciraolo logically leads to the con-
clusion that if a helicopter is operating lawfully, it is operating
within navigable airspace for the purposes of a fourth amendment
analysis . 5 However, a finding that the helicopter was: (a) lawfully
operated, or (b) operated within "navigable airspace" is not dis-
positive of the issue of what constitutes an invalid fourth amend-
ment search. The analysis must next determine whether the sur-
veillance was unreasonably intrusive.
III. HELICOPTERS ARE NOT UNREASONABLY INTRUSIVE
UNLESS INTRUSIVELY OPERATED
It is relatively easy to determine that an individual has mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy. The difficulty in a
fourth amendment analysis occurs in determining whether society
is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. The ques-
tion of when a helicopter surveillance becomes unreasonably intru-
sive has been addressed by a number of courts.
and reduced speed operations than helicopters. One police department in California pres-
ently uses an ultra light vehicle for aerial surveillance.
The Downey, California Police Department presently uses an ultra light vehicle for ae-
rial surveillance. Downey has used the ultra light for the last three and one half years and
finds it a very effective tool for observation. It is in flight for two to three hours per day,
and generally flies at the same altitude as a helicopter, rarely operating below 500 feet.
The ultra light has proven very effective at locating and following suspects on the ground.
Telephone interview with Captain Chelstrom, Downey Police Department, Downey, Cali-
fornia (March 11, 1988).
The Monterey Park, California Police Department has also experimented with ultra light
vehicles. Monterey Park used three ultra lights during the period 1982-1984. They were
used for patrol support and aerial surveillance over an area of approximately 7.7 square
miles with a population of approximately 72,600. The use of these craft was discontinued
due to increases in the costs of liability insurance. Telephone interview with Captain San-
toro, Monterey Park, California Police Department (March 11, 1988).
The factors suggested in this Comment may also be applied to the use of ultra light
vehicles as well as helicopters, when determining whether aerial observations constitute a
search for fourth amendment purposes. Although the question of when police use of an
ultra light vehicle will constitute a search is not yet before the Court, this Comment sug-
gests that day may not be far off.
55. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). In Ciraolo, the Court made
reference to both navigable airspace and "an officer's observations from a public vantage
point where he has a right to be .... "Id. at 213. Justice White noted that the California
Court of Appeals decision in Sabo, that the helicopter was not in navigable airspace was
"questionable, and even if this is technically correct, it remains true, that the helicopter
was lawfully positioned when the deputy observed the marijuana in respondent's green-
house. See California v. Sabo, 107 S. Ct. 2200 cert. denied (No. 86 -1289). (White, J.,
dissenting).
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A. Federal Cases Addressing Intrusiveness
In United States v. Allen,56 the Ninth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals noted that where there is some justifica-
tion for focusing a surveillance on a particular place, "as opposed
to random investigation to discover criminal activity, that factor is
weighed in the balance and contributes to justification for the
search. ' 57 In this case the defendant-resident lived in an area rou-
tinely traversed by Coast Guard helicopters. Thus, the defendant's
"aware[ness] of these routine flights," served to decrease their
intrusiveness.
Even more recently, in Giancola v. State of West Virginia De-
partment of Public Safety,58 the plaintiffs sought damages and
injunctive relief arising from a helicopter surveillance performed
to detect marijuana cultivation. The Fourth Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals noted that law enforcement officers
clearly have a legitimate interest in eradicating marijuana culti-
vating activities, and said that the pertinent inquiry was whether
"the aerial surveillance tactics utilized were unreasonably intru-
sive or went beyond reasonable efforts to determine if marijuana
was being grown in the area." 9 The court listed several factors
relevant in making such a determination:
1. The total number of instances of surveillance,
2. The frequency of surveillance,
3. The length of each surveillance,
4. The altitude of the aircraft,
5. The number of aircraft,
6. The degree of disruption of legitimate activities on the
ground, and
7. Whether any flight regulations were violated by the
surveillance.60
Although the record indicated that on one occasion two helicop-
ters flew over the plaintiff's property for ten to twenty minutes at
an altitude of 100 feet,6' the plaintiffs admitted that nothing on
the ground was disturbed by the wind generated by the rotors of
56. 633 F.2d 1282 (1981). In Allen, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the residents (the defendants) of a ranch along the Coos Bay,
Oregon coast, could not reasonably have a subjective expectation of privacy from aerial
observation by the United States Coast Guard. The court reasoned that Coast Guard heli-
copters routinely traversed that area for several reasons, including law enforcement, and
thus, the defendants were, no doubt, "aware of these routine flights." Id. at 1290.
57. Id.
58. 830 F.2d 547 (4th Cir. 1987).
59. Id. at 550. The court found that the plaintiffs had evidenced a subjective expec-
tation of privacy.
60. Id. at 550-51.
61. Id. at 548.
[Vol. 24
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the helicopter, and that the helicopters were not close enough to
determine the number of occupants or whether they were wearing
uniforms.6 2 The court determined that in this case, the aerial sur-
veillance was reasonable and did not violate the fourth
amendment.6 3
B. California Cases Addressing Intrusiveness
In People v. Superior Court (Stroud),64 the Second District of
the California Court of Appeal held that helicopter flights over
residential backyards at an altitude of 500 feet while searching for
stolen auto parts did not violate the fourth amendment.
In People v. Joubert,65 a fixed wing aircraft flew at an altitude
of 500 feet, circled over a nineteen-acre rural residential property
fifteen to twenty-five times, and was not found in violation of the
fourth amendment. A California Court of Appeal noted that peo-
ple who grow marijuana in the open do so at the risk of being
observed by police officers in the air. The only time that a person
will be deemed to have manifested an objectively reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy from overflights is when they employ a green-
house or otherwise cover the plants to shield them from aerial
observation. 66
In People v. Messervy,67 the court held that helicopter flights
over open fields at an altitude of only 150 feet while observing a
person loading a car next to growing marijuana plants also failed
to violate the fourth amendment.
In People v. Sabo,68 this issue of intrusiveness was further ad-
dressed. A deputy sheriff from La Mesa, California, on a routine
helicopter patrol observed what he believed was marijuana grow-
ing in a greenhouse located in the backyard of a residence. The
deputy was then joined by a deputy from the narcotics squad,
who, as the helicopter hovered 400 to 500 feet above the green-
house, observed and confirmed that marijuana was growing in the
greenhouse. The deputy made this observation by looking through
several missing roof and side panels of the greenhouse.6 9 A search
warrant was issued based upon the observations, the marijuana
was seized, and the greenhouse owner (the defendant) arrested.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evi-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 551.
64. 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974).
65. 118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981).
66. Id. at 646, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
67. 175 Cal. App. 3d 243, 248 (1985).
68. 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986).
69. Id. at 847, 849-50, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71, 172.
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dence that had been gained as a result of the aerial observations.
The court found that the greenhouse was within the curtilage of
the house, that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed, and
that the warrantless overflight was an unreasonable search in vio-
lation of the fourth amendment.7 0
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District af-
firmed. The court distinguished the Ciraolo decision, stating that
Ciraolo had a fenced backyard open to the sky and that the obser-
vation was made by a fixed wing aircraft flying at an altitude of
1,000 feet.71 The court concluded that Ciraolo did "not declare a
rule to govern aerial surveillance of the curtilage in all circum-
stances and at any altitude. . . because of the obvious difficulties
it creates.7 2 Stating that a case-by-case analysis is required con-
cerning helicopter observations outside of navigable airspace, the
court "judicially noticed the unique capabilities of the helicopter
to gambol in the sky-turning, curtsying, tipping, hummingbird-
like suspended in space, ascending, descending and otherwise con-
founding its fixed-wing brethren doomed to fly straight. .. .
The court reasoned that allowing observation from a lawfully
operated helicopter not within navigable airspace in order to vali,
date a search warrant would sanction "interminable hovering, a
persistent overfly, a treetop observation, all accompanied by the
thrashing of the rotor, the clouds of dust, and earsplitting din. ' '74
Without any indication that such action had taken place, the
court then held that the observation of the greenhouse constituted
an unreasonable invasion of the defendant's expectation of privacy
in violation of the fourth amendment."h
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case,
with Justice White dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. 0 Justice White said that the appellate court decision was a
highly questionable interpretation of the decision in Ciraolo.77 He
noted that "while it is certainly possible that helicopter surveil-
lance could be unreasonably intrusive on account of interminable
hovering, raising clouds of dust, creating unreasonable noise, and
so forth, nothing in the record indicates that any such factor was
70. Id. at 854, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 176. The Court of Appeal examined the issues in
this case so as to conform with the requirements of Proposition 8. Id. at 853, 230 Cal.
Rptr. at 175.
71. Id. at 850-51, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
72. Id. at 853, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 854, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
75. Id., 230 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
76. 107 S. Ct. 2200 (1987).
77. Id.
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present in this case. ''7 a
Very recently, in People v. Romo,7 9 an anonymous tip led police
to conduct aerial surveillance of the defendant's house and yard in
Ukiah, California. A helicopter flew over the house at an altitude
of no less than 500 feet, and the officer saw what he believed were
marijuana plants growing in a fenced-in area of the yard.80 A Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeal (1st Dist.) dismissed the Sabo court's def-
inition of navigable airspace and addressed the question of
whether the helicopter violated the defendant's privacy rights
under the fourth amendment.
The court noted that the real issue was whether the defendant's
subjective expectation of privacy in his backyard was a reasonable
one as defined by the second prong of Katz."1 The court then
noted that the Supreme Court in Ciraolo emphasized certain fac-
tors regarding this issue: (1) that the sighting was made from a
vantage point in the air at which the plane had a legal right to be,
and (2) that it was done in a physically nonintrusive manner.8"
The court then applied the factors used by the court in Giancola83
and held that the observation did not violate the defendant's
fourth amendment rights.
C. Other Jurisdictions Holding Aerial Surveillance Was Not
Intrusive
In State v. Stachler,"4 a police helicopter flew over a marijuana
patch fifteen feet from the owner's home at an altitude of 300 feet
during aerial surveillance. The Hawaii Supreme Court held this
was not a search within the fourth amendment. The court noted
that the "marijuana patch was open to the view of any member of
the public who happened to be flying over the defendant's prop-
erty,"8 5 and said the height of the helicopter was not determina-
tive, but was a factor to be considered. 6
In State v. Davis, 7 an Oregon case, a fixed wing aircraft which
operated at an altitude of 600 to 700 feet, flew over an area of
78. Id.
79. No. A037010 (Feb. 11, 1988)(available on Westlaw, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
85. Id. at 421, 570 P.2d at 1329. The court noted that there might be a different
result if the helicopter flew too low, or if there was continued aerial harassment or pro-
longed surveillance. Id. at 1328.
86. Id. at 418, 570 P.2d at 1327-28. See also Tennessee v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
87. 51 Or. App. 827, 627 P.2d 492 (1981).
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fifty to seventy-five homes, with a school, a medical clinic and a
store within a one-mile radius. The court held that this did not
violate the fourth amendment when the officers observed a mari-
juana patch 150 to 300 feet from two residential dwellings on
property which was fenced with a locked gate and posted with
"[n]o [t]respassing" signs.88
IV. SITUATIONS IN WHICH A HELICOPTER OVERFLIGHT IS
UNREASONABLY INTRUSIVE
"The fourth amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers
that certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government in-
terference."89 The fourth amendment stresses "the overriding re-
spect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our
traditions since the origins of the Republic.""0 In keeping with this
ideal, there is no question that residential backyards are used by
individuals for many activities recognized by society as private.
Fenced-in yards provide privacy from street level observation of
the use of swimming pools, 91 family gatherings and other intimate
and highly personal activities, such as love-making or nude sun-
bathing. Clearly, interminable hovering, raising clouds of dust,
creating unreasonable noise,9 2 and the "buzzing" and "dive bomb-
ing" of homes by helicopters would constitute an unreasonable in-
trusion within the meaning of the fourth amendment.93
Our concepts of privacy are based upon well recognized pat-
terns of modern life, but in modern life the "air has become a
public highway." 94 Private and commercial flight is a constant
88. Id. at 828, 627 P.2d at 493. Here, the court noted that the use of altitude regula-
tions established by the FAA to determine whether a search is lawful would produce a
"crazy quilt" out of the fourth amendment, with the" 'pattern of protection' being dictated
by the type of aircraft used for surveillance." Id. at 829, 627 P.2d at 494 (quoting Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
After Ciraolo, it seems clear that the aircraft must at least be operating lawfully and
that the FAA regulations are relevant to that determination. However, the determination
of whether an aerial observation is unreasonably intrusive is too important a question to be
determined by a mechanistic application of flight regulations promulgated by an adminis-
trative agency.
89. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
90. Id. at 179 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)).
91. In fact, the dissent in Ciraolo noted that the majority opinion omitted any refer-
ence "to the fact that respondent's yard contained a swimming pool and a patio for sun-
bathing and other private activities." Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 222 n.7. The trial court refused
to consider evidence offered at the suppression hearing that the yard was used for domestic
activities. Id.
92. California v. Sabo, 107 S. Ct. 2200. (1987) (White, J., dissenting to the denial
of certiorari).
93. See National Organization For Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F.
Supp. 945, 955-61 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
94. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
[Vol. 24
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss2/10
HELICOPTER OBSERVATIONS
presence in our society, and it is unreasonable to expect that
ground-level activities in areas open to the sky will not be ob-
served by persons traversing the skies.95
The Supreme Court has already held that the fourth amend-
ment does not require police officers to shield their eyes when
passing homes while on public thoroughfares. Similarly, police ob-
servation from a lawfully operated aircraft does not violate the
fourth amendment where that observation could be made by any
citizen so situated.96
"Certainly the Framers did not intend that the Fourth Amend-
ment should shelter criminal activity wherever persons with crimi-
nal intent choose to erect barriers and post 'No Trespassing'
signs."' 97 As Justice Harlan noted in United States v. White,98 the
question of whether an expectation is reasonable must be "an-
swered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the
likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security bal-
anced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law en-
forcement." 99 Thus, where police officers have reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that criminal activity is taking place at a certain
location, this is a factor to be weighed when determining whether
an expectation of privacy is legitimate. 10
In Riley v. State, the Florida Supreme Court noted that "pur-
poseful surveillance from the air simply lays open everything and
everyone below-whether marijuana plants, nude sunbathers, or
family members relaxing in their lawn chairs-to minute inspec-
tion."101 The court adopted the same reasoning as that of the
Fourth District of the California Court of Appeal in Sabo.' In
Riley, as in Sabo, there was nothing in the record to indicate that
the helicopter was unreasonably intrusive. The Riley court held
that merely by the act of "circling and descending below 'public
navigable airspace'," the observations impermissibly invaded the
defendant's privacy rights and constituted an illegal search in vio-
lation of the fourth amendment.0 3 But many other factors may
influence the perception of intrusiveness of a helicopter search.
The altitude of the helicopter is a weighty factor. The noise
generated by the helicopter is more intrusive at lower altitudes,
95. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
96. Id.
97. Oliver, 446 U.S. at 182 n.13.
98. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
99. Id. at 786 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
100. See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, at 1290 (1981).
101. 511 So.2d 282 (1987), cert. granted, (No. 87-764).
102. Id. at 288.
103. Id. at 289.
19881
15
Williams: Helicopter Observations: When do They Constitute a Search?
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
and the wind generated by the rotors has a greater effect on per-
sons and property at lower altitudes."l 4
Time of day may also be a factor. A helicopter hovering over a
residence at two o'clock in the morning, at an altitude of 300 to
500 feet, shining a search light in the backyard would probably
offend the sensibilities of most ordinary people. Conversely, the
same circumstances taking place at two o'clock in the afternoon
might well be viewed as reasonable.
Two or three helicopters circling over a residence obviously
would be more offensive than one helicopter, and similarly, one
helicopter circling for a lengthy period of time could be unreason-
ably offensive, where a helicopter quickly passing by would go al-
most unnoticed.
Consider also, the effect upon the sensibilities of an ordinary
person sunbathing in the backyard, who looks up to find a police
officer in an ultra-light aircraft, passing overhead at an altitude of
only fifty to one hundred feet. The determination as to whether
any of these observations constitute a search within the fourth
amendment should not be based solely upon whether the aircraft
was within "navigable airspace," regardless of how that is defined.
V. A SOLUTION: GUIDELINES FOR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
First, the factors laid out by the Giancola decision should be
used to determine whether an aerial observation by a helicopter or
any similar aircraft constitutes a search for fourth amendment
purposes. These are listed as factors one through seven:
1. The total number of instances of surveillance,
2. The timespan between each instance of surveillance
(frequency),
3. The length of each surveillance,
4. The altitude of the aircraft during the overflight,
5. How many helicopters or ultra light vehicles took part in
the surveillance (number of aircraft),
6. Whether the wind generated by the rotors (or propellers)
disturbed persons or property on the ground, and
7. Whether any flight regulations were violated by the surveil-
lance,10 1 for example, whether the aircraft was operated in a safe
104. "[P]rivacy interests are not coterminous with property rights. However, because
property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he
wishes in certain areas, [they] should be considered in determining whether an individual's
expectations of privacy are reasonable." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 189-190. (quoting Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978)) (citation omitted).
105. These factors are based, in part, upon Justice White's dissent in Sabo, 107 S.
Ct. at 2201. See also Giancola, 830 F.2d at 550-51.
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manner.
However, there are five additional factors necessary to make the
analysis complete. Thorough analysis of when an overflight sur-
veillance constitutes an illegal search requires, in addition to the
Giancola factors, factors eight through twelve listed below:
8. Whether the police had a reasonable suspicion that a crime
was being committed at that location,
9. The time of day when each instance of surveillance took
place,
10. The noise generated by the overflight,
11. Whether the location of the area surveyed is near an air-
port, and
12. Whether that type of overflight is a common occurrence in
that area.
The application of all of these factors will ensure the proper bal-
ancing between the individual's right to privacy and the legitimate
needs of society and its law enforcement agencies, whose duty is
to protect and serve society.
CONCLUSION
In Smith v. Maryland,10 6 the Supreme Court noted that when
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy for purposes of the fourth amendment, the question is
whether the individual's expectation of privacy, when "viewed ob-
jectively, is 'justifiable' under the circumstances.' ' ° Determina-
tions based upon the apprehension of future abuses, and nebulous
definitions of what constitutes "navigable airspace," requiring
mechanistic applications of regulations promulgated for fixed-wing
aircraft to the operation of helicopters, result in inconsistent deci-
sions and confusion among law enforcement agencies.
"The liberty shielded by the Fourth Amendment . . . is free-
dom 'from unreasonable government intrusions into . . . legiti-
mate expectations of privacy.' "108 The factor analysis suggested
in this Comment is offered as a comprehensive solution to the
problematic determination of when an aerial observation is so in-
trusive that it will constitute a search within the protection of the
fourth amendment.
John D. Williams*
106. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
107. Id. at 740 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 353 (1967)).
108. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 187 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977)).
* This article is dedicated to my late father. Special thanks to Professor Marilyn Ire-
land, California Western School of Law, for her special insight.
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